diff mbox series

[3/6] vhost/crypto: validate keys lengths

Message ID 20200518131704.715877-4-ferruh.yigit@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State Accepted, archived
Delegated to: David Marchand
Headers show
Series Fix vhost security issues | expand

Checks

Context Check Description
ci/Intel-compilation success Compilation OK
ci/checkpatch success coding style OK

Commit Message

Ferruh Yigit May 18, 2020, 1:17 p.m. UTC
From: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>

transform_cipher_param() and transform_chain_param() handle
the payload data for the VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_CREATE_SESS
message. These payloads have to be validated, since it
could come from untrusted sources.

Two buffers and their lenghts are defined in this payload,
one the the auth key and one for the cipher key. But above
functions do not validate the key length inputs, which could
lead to read out of bounds, as buffers have static sizes of
64 bytes for the cipher key and 512 bytes for the auth key.

This patch adds necessary checks on the key length field
before being used.

CVE-2020-10724
Fixes: e80a98708166 ("vhost/crypto: add session message handler")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaolong Ye <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
---
 lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c b/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c
index 2e52ecae87..0f9df4059d 100644
--- a/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c
+++ b/lib/librte_vhost/vhost_crypto.c
@@ -238,6 +238,11 @@  transform_cipher_param(struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xform,
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
 		return ret;
 
+	if (param->cipher_key_len > VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+		VC_LOG_DBG("Invalid cipher key length\n");
+		return -VIRTIO_CRYPTO_BADMSG;
+	}
+
 	xform->type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER;
 	xform->cipher.key.length = param->cipher_key_len;
 	if (xform->cipher.key.length > 0)
@@ -288,6 +293,12 @@  transform_chain_param(struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xforms,
 			&xform_cipher->cipher.algo);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
 		return ret;
+
+	if (param->cipher_key_len > VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+		VC_LOG_DBG("Invalid cipher key length\n");
+		return -VIRTIO_CRYPTO_BADMSG;
+	}
+
 	xform_cipher->type = RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_CIPHER;
 	xform_cipher->cipher.key.length = param->cipher_key_len;
 	xform_cipher->cipher.key.data = param->cipher_key_buf;
@@ -302,6 +313,12 @@  transform_chain_param(struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *xforms,
 	ret = auth_algo_transform(param->hash_algo, &xform_auth->auth.algo);
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
 		return ret;
+
+	if (param->auth_key_len > VHOST_USER_CRYPTO_MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH) {
+		VC_LOG_DBG("Invalid auth key length\n");
+		return -VIRTIO_CRYPTO_BADMSG;
+	}
+
 	xform_auth->auth.digest_length = param->digest_len;
 	xform_auth->auth.key.length = param->auth_key_len;
 	xform_auth->auth.key.data = param->auth_key_buf;